In contrast to the prevailing supply-side explanation that price decreases are the key driver of a sales take-off, we argue that outward shifting supply and demand curves lead to market take-off. Our fundamental idea is that sales in new markets are initially low since the first commercialized forms of new innovations are primitive. Then, as new firms enter, actual and perceived product quality improves (and prices possibly drop) which leads to a take-off in sales. To provide empirical evidence for this explanation, we explore the relationship between take-off times, price decreases, and firm entry for a sample of consumer and industrial product innovations commercialized in the US over the past 150 years. Based on a proportional hazards analysis of take-off times, we find that new firm entry dominates other factors in explaining observed sales take-off times. We also find no evidence that price mediates the relationship between firm entry and take-off time. We interpret these results as supporting the idea that demand shifts during the early evolution of a new market due to non-price factors is the key driver of a sales take-off. 
INTRODUCTION
The early market evolution of successful consumer and industrial product innovations is generally characterized by an initial period of slow growth immediately after commercialization that is eventually followed by a sharp increase (e.g., Mahajan, Muller, Bass 1990; Rogers 1995; Golder and Tellis 1997; Klepper 1997) . For most new products, the "take-off" point is clear since it corresponds to the first large increase in sales. The "hockey-stick" pattern of sales growth also seems to be popular among industry pundits as it is commonly used to depict the sales of really new technological products (e.g., Moore 1991) . See the examples in Figure 1 . 
Sales
The time to sales take-off can vary considerably across product innovations; some quickly achieve sales take-off after commercialization, whereas others languish for years with low sales (e.g., Mahajan, Muller, and Bass 1990; Golder and Tellis 1997) . Understanding the timing and causes of sales take-off is critically important for industry analysts and managers since they have serious short and long term resource implications for research & development, product development, marketing, and manufacturing.
Conventional wisdom holds that sales take-off times can primarily be explained in terms of supply-side factors (e.g., Bass 1980; Russell 1980; Metcalfe 1981; Foster, 1986; Stoneman and Ireland 1983; Golder and Tellis 1997) . According to this line of thought, increases in capacity associated with firm entry into a new market cause outward shifts in supply. This puts downward pressure on prices, which subsequently leads to increases in sales. Thus, the prevailing belief is that price is the key explanatory variable in determining the sales take-off time, i.e., sales for product innovations are initially low due to their relatively high prices; then as prices of these products decline, the new product crosses a threshold of affordability and sales dramatically take off.
In this paper, we argue that this explanation is incomplete. Our fundamental idea is that a sales take-off is caused by outward shifting supply and demand curves 1 . Thus, we propose that sales are initially low due to the relative primitiveness of the first commercialized forms of new innovations, and increases in sales occur as new firms enter the market. Firm entry not only affects supply but also demand for the product since product improvements, expanded distribution and increased consumer awareness of brand quality through promotional activities are key ways in which entering firms seek to differentiate themselves. We note that this explanation is consistent with findings in the economics and technology literature that firm competition in the early stages of new market growth focuses on continual product improvement (e.g., Shapiro 1986; Thomson 1986; Utterback 1994; Klepper 1997; Adner and Levinthal 2001) .
To provide empirical evidence for this explanation, we examine the role of price decreases and new firm entry in the initial take-off for a set of consumer and industrial product innovations commercialized in the US during the last 150 years. While recognizing that firm entry creates additional supply-side capacity, we follow prior research suggesting that entry in the formative stages of a new market is primarily associated with demand-side changes from incremental product improvements and efforts by firms to develop market infrastructure. If entry is only associated with outward shifts in the supply curve, firm entry and price declines should be highly correlated, with each explaining roughly the same amount of variance in sales take-off times.
Based on a proportional hazards analysis, we find that price reductions and new firm entry are significant explanatory variables. However, price reductions account for less than 5 percent of the variance in sales take-off times while new firm entry explains almost 50 percent of this same variance. Although we find no evidence of price mediating the effects of firm entry on sales take-off times, we find that price reductions matter more for products that can be improved with low R&D costs. We interpret these results as supporting the idea that demand-side shifts during the early market evolution of new innovations due to non-price factors is the key driver of the timing of a sales take-off.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a theoretical framework for the role of firm entry in shifting demand and supply curves, and its impact on the timing of a sales take-off. Section 3 presents an empirical analysis of the early market evolution and the take off phenomenon for a set of product innovations. Beginning with a description of the data sources and sample of consumer and industrial product innovations, we then outline our approach for identifying the take-off times and present descriptive statistics on key time intervals and empirical results based on proportional hazards analyses of take-off times.
Finally, in Section 4 we discuss the implications associated with our empirical findings, and in Section 5 we outline several directions for future research.
EXPLAINING THE TIMING OF A SALES TAKE-OFF
Although our theoretical framework for the role of price decreases and incremental product improvements in leading to a sales take-off can be formalized mathematically, for ease of exposition we present our ideas in terms of simple supply and demand concepts. Following the industrial organization literature (e.g., see the reviews in Geroski 1991; 1995), we focus on the role of firm entry in shifting the industry supply and demand curves. As suggested by Figure 2 , we note that the literature finds a sharp take-off in the number of firms in the early stages of market evolution (e.g., Gort and Klepper 1982; Rosegger and Baird 1987; Klepper and Graddy 1990; Utterback and Suarez 1993; Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994; Utterback 1994; Agarwal and Gort 1996; Klepper and Simons 1997; 2000) . However, this research does not directly consider the sales take-off phenomenon, as the emphasis is more on explaining the eventual evolution in market structure that occurs as an industry matures (Klepper 1997) 2 .
As suggested by these studies, firm entry into a new market results in increased capacity.
Particularly in the context of new product markets, firm entry also may involve an increase in competition or decreases in production costs due to new process innovations. Concentrating on this supply-side perspective, several researchers argue that a price decrease is the key factor leading to a take off in sales (e.g., Russell 1980; Foster 1986; Golder and Tellis 1997) and theoretical research concludes that optimal prices are decreasing when the supply curve shifts outward (e.g., Bass 1980; Metcalfe 1981; Stoneman and Ireland 1983; Klepper 1996) . Empirical studies supporting this conclusion include Golder and Tellis (1997) who find quick sales take-off times for new consumer durables that have low relative prices, and Agarwal (1998) who reports declining price trends for most new consumer and industrial products. 
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At the same time however, the literature also indicates that firm entry during the early years of market evolution can shift the demand curve outward. Demand increases stem from firm activities in new markets that are geared towards increasing actual or perceived product quality 3 .
As suggested by Gort and Klepper (1982) , early entrants often bring crucial new information, skills and product quality improvements that result in demand increases. This is particularly important since the early commercialized forms of new innovations are generally quite primitive (e.g., Rosenberg 1982; Shapiro 1986; Thomson 1986; Klepper 1997) . Further, as a new 3 Using methods like hedonic price analysis to account for changes in product quality over time has a long and rich history in the economics literature (e.g., see the review in Gordon 1990 ). However, we do not employ such methods in our study. Aside from the fact that suitable data to conduct these analyses are unavailable for the product innovations we study, it is not clear that these methods are appropriate for the early market time periods of interest to our research. In particular, hedonic analyses can only evaluate quality improvements when the product form has stabilized (i.e., the set of important attributes is established) which is not the case during the early evolution of new markets. See Gordon (1990) for a discussion of other pitfalls associated with hedonic analyses. market evolves, the consumer base expands due to increases in product offerings as well as product differentiation attempts by both new entrants and incumbents that respond to the threat caused by new entrants (e.g., Brown 1981; Bayus and Putsis 1999) . Several researchers note that competition during the early stages of market growth is primarily on the basis of continued product improvements (e.g., see reviews in Geroski 1991; Klepper 1997) . Consistent with this idea, Gort and Konakayama (1982) report a positive and significant relationship between firm entry and the rate of patenting for a sample of seven industrial innovations 4 .
In addition to the above studies examining broad indicators of product quality improvements through entry across several product-markets, detailed evidence of the relationship between early firm entry and product improvements is also available from various industry case studies (e.g., Christensen 1993; Utterback 1994) . Consider, for example, the evolution of major product and process innovations (innovations ranked 4 or higher on a 7-point scale by Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, 1983) in the automobile industry shown in Table 1 . We note that firm entry in this industry accelerated only after 1899, and sales of automobiles did not take off until 1909.
As discussed in Klepper and Simons (1997) , product innovation in the automobile industry was greatest from commercialization until the first decade of the twentieth century, whereas process innovation was very low during this period. More importantly, Klepper and Simons (1997) note that it was new entrants that contributed the largest share of product innovations, including the front-mounted four-cylinder engine, shaft-driven transmission and pressed steel frame, and caused the automobile to evolve from its bicycle and carriage origins towards the design of "luxury" cars pioneered in France. Introduced in 1908, Ford's Model T represented the culmination of many of these incremental product improvements. Not surprisingly, sales dramatically increased in 1909. The later history of the automobile industry shows that the majority of process improvements came after 1909, with the most dramatic improvements in manufacturing occurring after the sales take-off when Ford pioneered the moving assembly line (1913) (1914) . Klepper and Simons (1997) state that with few exceptions, the industry's major 4 While patent statistics may seem like an obvious measure of incremental product improvements, it has several limitations. For example, innovations vary in their impact on the technological environment and a count of patents will not necessarily capture the differences in the importance of innovations (e.g., Schmookler 1966; Pakes 1985) . Gort and Klepper (1982) note that patent counts do not clearly distinguish between product and process improvements, or between major and minor innovations. Industries can also differ in their propensity to patent, due in part to existing tradeoffs between the exclusive rights granted by a patent and the loss of secrecy. See Griliches (1990) for a general review of patent statistics and their use. process innovations were dominated by the largest firms (Ford and General Motors). Although anecdotal in nature, this example strongly suggests that product improvements in the automobile industry occurred during the early years of market evolution when firm entry was high. Studies also indicate that product improvements, relative to process improvements, are typically emphasized in the early stages of a new market (e.g., Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Utterback 1994; Klepper 1996; Klepper and Simons 1997) . Thus, it is not surprising that the dramatic price decreases due to declining costs from process improvements and increasing cumulative sales volume are usually observed only after the sales take-off (e.g., Bass 1980; Metcalfe 1981; Stoneman and Ireland 1983) .
In addition to incremental product innovations, demand for the product may also increase from efforts by incumbents and new firms to increase perceived product quality 5 . For example, extensive advertising and promotion may be required to educate and inform potential consumers about the benefits of a new product innovation (e.g., the first phonographs brought the famous opera singer Caruso into your home). As suggested by Brown (1981) , the timing of a sales takeoff for a product innovation may also be related to the existence and evolution of a market infrastructure, i.e., new firm entry may proxy for infrastructure development. This infrastructure can take different forms and might be established in various ways. New distribution channels and pricing arrangements may be necessary for some innovations (e.g., sewing machines required the establishment of new retail outlets as well as credit terms). Widespread adoption of product innovations often requires the development of complementary products and services (e.g., automobiles needed roads and gas stations). These fundamental infrastructure developments often take place as a result of new entry into the market, either as new information is brought in by entrants or as competitive strategies of incumbents to stave off entry.
Thus, based on the discussion so far, new firm entry clearly impacts both the supply and demand of a new product innovation. Accordingly, our first hypothesis highlights the importance of new firm entry in the take off of product innovations.
H 1 : Product innovations with a high (low) level of new firm entry have short (long) takeoff times.
We next address the relative importance of demand and supply-side effects associated with firm entry as explanatory factors for sales take-off. The related literature has generally emphasized supply-side effects, and thus concludes that price declines are the crucial determinant of sales take-off (e.g., Golder and Tellis 1997) . However, outward shifting demand and supply results in unambiguously increasing sales but an indeterminate price effect. Further, the demand increasing efforts of firms may come at additional costs, which can affect product supply. For example, crucial R&D expenditures in the early years of market evolution may actually increase costs, thereby offsetting effects of outward shifts in supply on price. Thus, the possibility of outward shifting demand and supply implies that sales increases may be associated with either higher or lower prices. Importantly, this ambiguity in price effects can possibly account for actual industry cases such as turbojet engines, cathode ray tubes and microwave ovens in which sales took off even though prices were increasing.
Following prior empirical research, the isolated effects of supply shifts during the early stages of new market formation can be assessed by relating a direct measure of price decreases to take-off times. By studying the relationship between price decreases, new firm entry, and takeoff times across a set of product innovations, we can also explore the role of shifting supply and demand curves in leading to a sales take-off. To the extent that supply-side factors alone drive take-off times, price declines and firm entry should be highly correlated, with each separately accounting for very similar amounts of variance in observed take-off times. On the other hand, if demand-side factors are also important, firm entry should contribute some explanatory power beyond price decreases in explaining observed take-off times (since in this case, firm entry will include the effects of price decreases due to both supply and demand changes). If demand shifts, due to the non-price factors associated with new firm entry, are a key driver of take-off times, firm entry should dominate price as an explanatory variable of take-off times. Alternatively, if price mediates the relationship between firm entry and take-off time, then a statistically significant relationship between firm entry and take-off time should disappear when price is added to the model (e.g., Baron and Kenny 1986 ).
Based on this discussion, our second set of competing hypotheses addresses the relative importance of supply (measured directly by changes in price) and demand (measured indirectly as the impact of new firm entry after accounting for price effects) in explaining take-off times. 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARKET TAKE-OFF
In this section, we focus our attention on the sales take-off time and possible explanations for its variation across products. Similar to prior research efforts, we do not consider the possible sales patterns after take-off (e.g., some products like 8-track tape and videodisc players did achieve a sales take-off but had very short market lifetimes). Since we use secondary data to empirically study the market evolution of product innovations, our study is consistent with prior research in that we only consider "successful" innovations. However, this concern is mitigated by the fact that new products historically exhibit a wide variation in the time to sales take-off.
Since several products in our sample take well over twenty years before achieving a take-off (e.g., see Figure 1 ), innovations that could have been considered "failures" based on their very low sales in the early years of industry formation are included in our analysis. We also examine the take-off phenomenon for industrial as well as consumer products.
Data Sources
To develop an appropriate sample of innovations, we began by consulting various technical sources, scientific journals, chronologies, and encyclopedias of new inventions. To be considered for inclusion in our study, a consumer or industrial product innovation had to be deemed significant by experts in the field, and result in entirely new product-markets rather than improvements or sub-sections of existing markets. Once an appropriate list of innovations was identified, the hurdle then became the availability of consistent data for variables related to both demand (sales, price) and market structure (number of firms).
Accurate historical data on new product-markets are typically very difficult to obtain, and even harder is the task of matching sales and price information to data on entry and the number of firms competing in the market. While there are several consumer and industrial product innovations for which sales and price information are available, often data on the entry, exit and number of firms are not readily available (or vice versa). After several hundred personhours of research, we were able to develop consistent time series data on the key variables for 30 product innovations introduced in the U.S. between 1849 and 1983 (see Table 2 for a list of the product innovations). Our sample size compares favorably with the average sample size of 14 product categories used in prior new product diffusion studies (Sultan, Farley, and Lehmann 1990) . These 30 innovations encompass a broad spectrum of important products introduced over the past 150 years, and include a diverse mix of consumer and industrial products, as well as products that vary in their capital and technological intensiveness. In addition, the product innovations we study overlap with those studied by other researchers (i.e., Table 2 includes 13 of the new consumer durables examined by Golder and Tellis 1997, and 11 of the consumer and industrial innovations studied by Gort and Klepper 1982) . 1947 1970 1974 1976 Monitor 1927 1971 1975 Microcomputer 1962 1974 1977 1982 Home VCR 1951 1974 1975 Compact Disc Player 1979 1983 1984 1985 Cellular Telephone 1970 1983 1985 Optical Disc Drive 1979 1984 1993 Annual data were gathered for these 30 products from a variety of published sources (see the Appendix for a summary of these sources). Since we had no prior information on the actual take-off times for each product, the collected data generally extended well beyond the introduction and growth stages. Information on the commercialization date, entry, exit and number of firms producing the product in any given year were mainly compiled from the Thomas Register of American Manufacturers, a source that has been widely used to study the evolution of markets (e.g., Gort and Klepper 1982; Klepper and Graddy 1990; Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994; Agarwal and Gort 1996; Klepper and Simons 2000; Robinson and Min 2001) 6 . The Thomas Register, which dates back to 1906, is a national buying guide that is used primarily by purchasing agents 7 . In extensively describing various sources of business information, Lavin (1992) states that the Thomas Register is the best example of a directory that provides information on manufacturers by focusing on products. According to Lavin (1992) , "The Thomas Register is a comprehensive, detailed guide to the full range of products manufactured in the United States. Covering only manufacturing companies, it strives for a complete representation within that scope." In choosing product markets, we excluded those product markets for which there was a lack of consistency of boundaries between the Thomas Register and those defined by other agencies such as the U.S. Census of Manufacturers and various trade organizations. This ensured accurate matching of the data for the number of firms with data on sales and price information. In addition, multiple Thomas Register categories were combined as needed to ensure the inclusion of all competitors in a market 8 . Firm listings were also subjected to several checks to ensure actual market entry rather than a renaming, relocation, or merger between existing firms (see Agarwal 1997 for details). We also used the asset size class reported in the Thomas Register to categorize firms as large or small after appropriately adjusting the boundaries of these classes over time to account for inflation 9 .
6 Some product innovations introduced in the nineteenth century were added because reliable information was available from reputable published sources (see Appendix A). While we recognize that many innovations were commercialized in local markets shortly after their invention (often by the inventors themselves), we follow Gort and Klepper (1982) and Agarwal and Gort (1996) by assuming that the "commercialization" year is the first year the product was listed in the Thomas Register. 7 The importance of imports in manufacturing has increased over the last few decades. The Thomas Register includes foreign manufacturers of the product if the firm maintains an office or distribution channel for its product in the United States. Foreign firms that operate plants in the U.S. are also included.
Data for sales and average price were compiled from a variety of sources (see Appendix A) widely used by other researchers (e.g., Golder and Tellis 1997; Agarwal 1998) . The annual prices for each product were either deflated by the Consumer Price Index (consumer products) or the Producer Price Index (industrial products) to correct for inflation and general productivity changes (economy wide rather than product specific). Finally, we also estimated an "invention" year for each product innovation based on several published sources (e.g., Giscard d'Estaing 1986) and analyses (e.g., Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman 1958; Enos 1962; Mensch 1979; Kohli, Lehmann, and Pae 1999) . We recognize, however, that there is considerable controversy over the accuracy of dating inventions (e.g., Freeman, Clark, and Soete 1982; Rosenberg 1994 ).
Thus, these dates are only included to fill out the timeline of market evolution, and should be used with caution.
Key Variable Definitions and Hypotheses
Our two key explanatory variables are price declines and firm entry. In addition, we consider several control variables, including year of commercialization, World War 2, and product type. We do not include other economy-wide variables such as GNP since none were significant in explaining the take-off times. The variables we consider are summarized in Table   3 as well as briefly discussed below.
Changes in Price.
To measure changes in price, we follow prior observations (e.g., Bass 1995) and empirical analyses (e.g., Bayus 1992) by fitting an exponential time trend (λe θt ) to the annual price series for each innovation. As expected, excellent fits are obtained. In this way, our measure of changes in Price is the estimated exponential coefficient θ (which is independent of take-off times). 
New Firm
Year of Commercialization. Since our sample of product innovations encompasses a time
horizon of more than a century, it is highly likely that there have been significant changes in the economic climate in which firms operate. Some notable examples include the broad leaps in communications and transportation, the general growth in GNP, and the expansion of populations and markets (through globalization, etc.). The year of product commercialization is one way to control for any systematic changes that may have occurred in the underlying structural conditions and barriers to entry across our sample of product innovations over time.
Consistent with prior research, we expect that the effect of Commercialization Year on the probability of take-off is positive.
World War 2. Major economic upheavals due to events such as World War 2 can affect take off times. Therefore, our analyses include a dummy variable controlling for the possible effects of World War 2 on take-off times. We expect that the take-off time is greater for an innovation if World War 2 occurred between its commercialization and its time to firm or sales take-off 10 .
Product Type. The variation in take-off times across product innovations may be related to product characteristics 11 .
In particular, the resources required to improve an early commercialized form of a new product is expected to be negatively associated with take-off times. We control for the possible relationship between take-off times and product improvement costs by including a measure of R&D costs. Cross sectional differences in the product markets are measured by constructing a "steady-state" measure of R&D Costs, calculated as average R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales between 1987-1997 for each innovation in our sample (at the three-digit SIC level) using NSF data. Although we recognize that this is a crude measure, it represents the best set of consistent data that are available 12 . We also note that the mean R&D costs in our sample of products (4.92) is not statistically different 10 Although not reported here, our analyses revealed that effects due to World War 1 and the Great Depression are insignificant. 11 We also examined a dummy variable capturing whether the innovation is a component or factor of production for other product "systems" (i.e., outboard engine, freon compressor, cathode ray tube, styrene, piezoelectric crystals, turbojet engine, magnetic recording tape, heat pump) or a good for final consumption. No significant results were obtained. 12 We note that relying on the later years for this measure of R&D costs may seem biased against products introduced early in the century since technological intensity varies over the product life cycle and is expected to be highest when a product innovation is first introduced. However, this concern is partly alleviated by two facts. One, the technological intensity of the industries is remarkably stable over a long period of time (e.g. chemicals, aircrafts, communications, etc). Two, several of the product innovations in our study that are associated with high R&D costs were introduced early in the century (e.g. automobiles).
from the mean R&D costs across all US industries (4.67), indicating that our sample does not over-represent high R&D cost industries. 
Year of Commercialization
Year of product commercialization (see Table 2 
Determining Take-Off Times
To consistently identify take-off times, we follow Gort and Klepper (1982) and Agarwal and Gort (1996) by using a statistical procedure that is based on a generalized version of discriminant analysis. Briefly, this methodology allows us to distinguish between any two consecutive intervals by examining the data on annual percentage change in sales (for the sales take-off) and annual net entry rates (for firm take-off) for each product. To determine the takeoff year for a product, we first partition the appropriate series into three categories---the first and third categories contain the years where the percentage change in sales or net entry rate clearly reflect the pre-and post-take-off periods, respectively. Periods for the "in-between" years are then optimally classified based on mean values.
As a final validity check, we also carefully matched the calculated take-off times with information in available published histories of the product innovations. Applying this procedure to each of our 30 product innovations gives the take-off times reported in Table 2 . For the set of product innovations we consider, it is clear that the firm and sales take-off years do indeed represent sharp increases over the prior year since, on average, the percentage change in the number of firms at firm take-off is +123% and the percentage change in sales at sales take-off is +136%. Figure 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics on key variables. In agreement with the literature (e.g., Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman 1958; Mensch 1979; Kohli, Lehmann, and Pae 1999) , the time between invention and commercialization is generally very long (the average for our product innovations is almost 30 years). Consistent with Schumpeter's (1939; 1943) thesis that early entrants into a new market base their entry decisions on expected rather than realized sales, Table 2 shows that firm take-off precedes sales take-off for every one of our 30 product innovations. Moreover, for 26 of the 30 innovations, firm take-off preceded sales take-off by three or more years. As shown in Figure 4 , the mean time between commercialization and firm take-off is just over 6 years for our set of innovations, and the mean time between firm and sales take-off is 8 years. Table 4 suggests that the time intervals vary by commercialization year. In particular, the time between commercialization and firm take-off has significantly declined over time for this set of product innovations, and the time between commercialization and sales take-off has also shrunk. Interestingly, the time between firm and sales take-off has not significantly declined over this period. In addition, Table 4 suggests that the fraction of large entrants has increased over the last 150 years (e.g., see also Chandler 1977) . Figure 4 reports that New Firm Entry between commercialization and firm take-off for our set of innovations is 55%, i.e. over half of the competitors in each year before the firm takeoff tend to be new entrants. However, these firms still only represent 13% of all potential competitors (see the Relative # Firms Ratio in Figure 4 , defined as the ratio of the number of firms to the peak number of firms over the observed product life cycle). New Firm Entry between the firm and sales take-off is 30%, and by the year of sales take-off, 44% of all the potential competitors have already entered the market. Together, these results indicate that i.e., a large fraction of the competitors in a new market enter before the sales take-off (although over half of a new market's eventual competitors do enter after the sales take-off). These statistics strongly suggest that the monopoly period for a product innovation is brief at best, and occurs well before the product growth stage.
Descriptive Statistics
Based on the estimated exponential price trends for each innovation, Figure 4 also reports that the percentage change in price between commercialization and year prior to firm take-off is -31%, and between firm and year prior to sales take-off is -40%. Clearly, prices are declining over time for this set of product innovations.
Although the details are not reported here, we also explored the potential relationship between firm entry, entrant size, and market opportunity. We find that New Firm Entry between commercialization and year prior to firm take-off is a significant negative correlate with the percentage of entrant firms that are small (r=-0.41; p≤0.05). On the other hand, entrant size is not significantly related to New Firm Entry between firm and year prior to sales take-off.
Although entrepreneurs may play a pivotal role in the initial commercialization of a product innovation (e.g., Schumpeter 1943; Feller 1967) , these results suggest that the entry of larger firms with greater resources and commitment to build the market may attract other firms to the nascent industry. These results are also consistent with the idea that potential industry participants need some signal (e.g., the participation of larger firms) that an infant industry is "legitimate" before they enter en masse (e.g., Aldrich 1999; Van de Ven, et al. 1999) . We also find that New Firm Entry between firm and year prior to sales take-off is a significant negative correlate with the relative number of firms at take-off (r=-0.40; p≤0.05). At the same time, the relative number of firms is not significantly related to New Firm Entry between commercialization and year prior to firm take-off. These results suggest that the entrants after firm take-off base their entry decision on perceived market opportunities as reflected by the remaining competitive potential associated with the product innovation. Not surprisingly, these entrants generally want to get to market before the competitive landscape is fully established (e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery 1998).
Estimation Approach and Results
We use Cox's (1972) proportional hazards regression model to study sales take-off times. The proportional hazards model is appropriate since it allows for estimation of the determinants of the hazard rate, i.e., the probability of take-off in period t given that the product has not taken off till period t-1. See Helsen and Schmittlein (1993) for an excellent discussion of this model and its benefits over other modeling approaches.
For the i th product, the hazard rate function h i (t) is defined as
where α(t) is an arbitrary and unspecified baseline hazard function, x i is a vector of measured explanatory variables for the i th product, and β is the vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated. As suggested by Allison (1984) , we do not include a term for unobserved heterogeneity since we only analyze non-repeated events. Parameter estimation is accomplished using the partial likelihood method as implemented in the SAS PHREG procedure. To account for the possibility that two product innovations have the same observed take-off time, we assume that there is a true but unknown ordering for the tied events times and use the EXACT method in the SAS PHREG procedure (e.g., see Allison 1995 for details) 13 . Table 5 reports the results of our proportional hazards analyses of sales take-off times 14 .
We note that the same basic results are also obtained for various sub-samples of the product innovations. We use McFadden's (1974) Likelihood Ratio Index, ρ 2 (which, for our models, is the same as the U 2 measure discussed by Hauser 1978) , as a measure of model fit (0<ρ 2 <1).
The Likelihood Ratio Index is calculated as 1 -L(x)/L 0 , where L(x) is the log likelihood of the model with covariates and L 0 is the null model.
From the results presented in Table 5 , New Firm Entry is significant and in the expected direction for all models. Thus, H 1 is strongly supported, i.e., a sales take-off occurs quickly (slowly) for innovations with a high (low) fraction of new entrants. As indicated by the results for Model 1, Price decreases are significantly related to sales take-off times. In addition, Model
reports the estimation results with the other control variables: Commercialization Year and
World War 2 are not significant, whereas R&D Costs is negative and significant. This latter result suggests that product innovations for which there are relatively high costs of improvement tend to have longer take-off times. In addition, we find no evidence that price mediates the relationship between firm entry and take-off times. Following Baron and Kenny (1986) , price acts as a mediator when: (1) takeoff time is significantly related to price and firm entry separately, (2) price and firm entry are significantly related, and (3) a significant relationship between firm entry and sales take-off time disappears when price is added to the model. Condition 1 is satisfied since the results for Model 1 in Table 5 Taking these results together, we find strong evidence that firm entry into a new market dominates price in explaining the timing of a sales take-off. Thus, H 2b is supported. Given our discussion in Section 2, we interpret these results as supporting the idea that demand shifts due to actual and perceived improvements in product quality during the early market evolution of innovations is the key driver of a sales take-off.
At the same time however, the fact that prices are generally declining over time suggests that the supply curve is also shifting outward. Since both the demand and supply curves are shifting outward, we further explore two possible explanations for our empirical results that firm entry explains sales take off better than price reductions 17 . First, it may be that growth in demand leads to a transitory disequilibrium which delays price reductions. In this case, the duration of disequilibrium should be inversely related to entry barriers in the market. However, 15 It is noteworthy that the ρ 2 values we report in Table 5 (Models 2-5) are much higher than the ρ 2 value of 0.31 reported by Golder and Tellis (1997) . 16 We note that there may be several reasons why some factors are significant in a single-variable model, yet insignificant in a multivariate model. For example, it is possible that after controlling for New Firm Entry, the other factors do not affect the likelihood of take-off. More likely though, is that the model without New Firm Entry is mis-specified (i.e., there is an omitted variable in this model). Thus, it may be that the estimated coefficient for Price is biased upwards, resulting in the significant conclusions for the single variable model in Model 1.
as noted above the correlation between Price (a proxy for price reduction lags 18 ) and New Firm Entry (a proxy for entry barriers) is insignificant. This suggests that the speed of price declines (and thus price lags) is not related to barriers to entry. A second possible explanation is that the R&D costs related to product improvements may vary greatly across innovations and these R&D costs may offset the effects of manufacturing cost reducing process innovations or additional capacity that are associated with price reductions. Consistent with this idea, we find that the correlation of Price and R&D Costs is positive and significant (r = 0.43; p = 0.01). In addition, Price and R&D Costs should have a positive interactive effect on the probability of take-off (i.e., the effect of price reductions on sales take-off is observed for innovations that have relatively low costs of product improvements). We note that this explanation is consistent with our emphasis on the critical role of product improvements in the early stages of new markets. From Model 5 in Table 5 , we find that Price and New Firm Entry are significant and have the expected coefficient signs 19 . Moreover, the interaction of Price and R&D Costs is significant and has a positive effect on the probability of a sales take-off for our set of product innovations. This result suggests that innovations with steep price declines (i.e., Price<<0) and low costs of product improvement tend to have higher probabilities of sales take-off than innovations with steep price declines and high R&D costs. Thus, although New Firm Entry is still the dominant explanatory variable of a sales take-off, we find evidence that a sales take-off occurs quickly with price reductions in product innovations for which the costs associated with quality improvements are relatively low 20 .
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Three key findings emerge from our empirical analyses of the market evolution and take-off of consumer and industrial product innovations.
18 Similar conclusions are obtained for other measures of price lags, including time to a 5% reduction in price after takeoff and average price reduction one year after take-off. 19 Since we have specific hypotheses about the coefficient signs, we use one-tail significance levels in Table 5 . The same basic conclusion is also obtained using two tailed tests with a more "lenient" alpha level of 0.20 (see Stevens 1996 for a discussion of improving the power of statistical tests for small samples using higher alpha level tests). See Boland, et. al. (2001) for a recent example that uses an 80 percent confidence level for analyses involving small samples. 20 It is interesting to note that the correlation between Price and New Firm Entry is negative and significant for the 13 product innovations in our sample that were also analyzed by Golder and Tellis (1997) . We further note that R&D costs for these 13 products are not significantly different from the other 17 products. These results suggest that price reductions may play a more important role for the consumer durables considered by Golder and Tellis (1997) than for the broader set of consumer and industrial product innovations we study.
( Our first finding adds to the limited empirical research on the take-off phenomenon that has appeared in distinct literatures, i.e., evidence for a sales take-off is reported in Golder and Tellis (1997) and for a firm take-off in Gort and Klepper (1982) . Our second and third findings represent new empirical results that have not as yet been reported in the published literature.
Our third finding is also good news for managers of product innovations since it suggests that sales growth does not have to necessarily come at the expense of compressed profit margins typically associated with declining prices.
Our findings add to the set of empirical regularities that have been reported in the literature (e.g., see the review in Klepper 1997) . Based on our accumulated knowledge to this point, we speculate that the market evolution for a product innovation unfolds as follows. First, there is an initial discovery of a potential product innovation. Typically a long incubation period ensues after the pioneering invention, which is eventually followed by the commercialization of various specific product forms by one or more small and/or large firms.
Based on early competitive activity in the nascent market (e.g., the relative number of initial entrants that are small entrepreneurs or large corporations, the early entrants' level of success, etc.), potential entrants update their assessments of the benefits and risks associated with entry.
As the new market evolves over time, competing firms collectively legitimize it to be a real opportunity. The number of firms competing in the new market then takes off as entrants rush in anticipating large profits. As a result, supply-side capacity increases. Demand also increases due to the aggressive non-price competition that occurs among incumbents and entrants in new oligopolistic markets, i.e., in the early stages of market evolution, fierce competition usually centers on demand enhancing efforts such as R&D directed towards product improvements.
Depending on the specific product innovation and the nature of its supply and demand curves, prices can decrease or increase. As a result of this competitive activity, consumers eventually legitimize the product innovation by accepting that it provides real benefits over existing products. Sales of the product innovation then take off. After the sales take-off, both sales and the number of competing firms continue to increase but at a decreasing rate. Eventually, there is a shakeout of firms in the industry, and the number of competitors drops and then stabilizes.
We note however, that this "story" is speculative at this point since it has not been formally tested with a complete set of empirical data.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Although our results strongly suggest that non-price competition associated with new firm entry rather than price decreases drives sales take-off for product innovations, research involving other measures of product evolution and improvement should be conducted to confirm this finding. Furthermore, our results imply that models of new product sales need to explicitly account for the take-off phenomenon and product evolution during the early stages of market development. Thus for example, future research dealing with sales diffusion models (e.g., Bass 1980; Mahajan, Muller and Bass 1990 ) and models of the evolution of new markets (e.g., Klepper and Graddy 1990; Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994; Klepper 1996) should make provisions to account for these findings. It is likely that such research will require additional theoretical modeling of the take-off phenomenon.
Efforts by new entrants to increase sales may take many forms, including product improvements, promotional activities that educate consumers, and market infrastructure development associated with expanded distribution. While our results link new firm entry to sales take-off, further research is needed to assess the importance of each of these demandenhancing factors. For instance, as suggested by Brown (1981) , the time between firm and sales take-off for a product innovation may be related to the existence and evolution of a market infrastructure. This infrastructure can take different forms and might be established in various ways. Thus, it may be that the market infrastructure for a product innovation must be developed before a sales take-off can occur, and perhaps occurs concurrently or ensues shortly after entry.
This line of reasoning suggests that an important topic for future research is to empirically investigate the relationship between firm entry, market infrastructure development, and sales take-off.
Our empirical results also indicate that competition is important to the market evolution and take-off of product innovations. In particular, we find that a sharp increase in the number of competing firms in a new market precedes a sales take-off and high firm entry rates are associated with quicker sales take-offs. Thus, our results imply that a strategy of erecting entry barriers is not conducive to the market take-off of a product innovation, i.e., monopolies dampen the growth of new markets. In addition, firms may be able to collectively influence the take-off of a product innovation. Consequently, individual firm decisions on advertising expenditures, distribution policies, and product development (e.g., technology standards and cross-licensing policies) may influence own brand sales as well as the growth rate of the total market. With an eye towards identifying the factors related to a swift sales take-off, future research could thus empirically and analytically investigate the nature of firm alliances and collaborations during the formative stages of a new market. 
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